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THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH LEVEL PANEL: 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RELATED ISSUES 
 
by Graham S. Pearson 
 
Introduction 
 
1.  The Secretary-General in his speech1 to the General Assembly in September 2003 argued 
that the United Nations faced a decisive moment.  He pointed out that in his September 2003 
report2 on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration3 he had said that: 
 
The United Nations finds itself at a critical juncture: unless the Security Council 
regains the confidence of States and of world public opinion, individual States will 
increasingly resort exclusively to their own national perceptions of emerging threats 
and to their own judgement on how best to address them.  To forestall such a 
development, the United Nations will have to demonstrate its ability to deal with the 
most difficult issues, and to do so effectively. 
 
and in his speech to the General Assembly he went on to say that he would establish a High-
Level Panel of eminent personalities, to which he would assign four tasks: 
 
First, to examine the current challenges to peace and security; 
 
Second, to consider the contribution which collective action can make in addressing 
these challenges; 
 
Third, to review the functioning of the major organs of the United Nations and the 
relationship between them; and 
 
Fourth, to recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations, through reform of 
its institutions and processes. 
 
He added that the Panel will focus primarily on threats to peace and security. But it will also 
need to examine other global challenges, in so far as these may influence or connect with 
those threats. 
 
2.  The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was established4 on 3 
November 2003 with the terms of reference specifically to: 
 
(a) Examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to 
international peace and security. While there may continue to exist a diversity of 
perceptions on the relative importance of the various threats facing particular 
                                                 
1 United Nations Secretary-General, Address to the General Assembly, 23 September 2003.  Available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=517 
2 United Nations General Assembly, Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of 
the Secretary-General, A/58/323, 2 September 2003. 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 55/2 United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted 8 
September 2000, A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000. 
4 United Nations General Assembly, Letter dated 3 November 2003 from the Secretary-General to the President 
of the General Assembly, A/58/612, 28 November 2003. 
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Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find an appropriate balance 
at a global level. It is also important to understand the connections between different 
threats; 
 
(b) Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing 
these challenges; 
 
(c) Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collection action, including 
but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United Nations. 
 
3.  The membership of the High-Level Panel was: 
 
Anand Panyarachun (Thailand) (Chair) Former Prime Minister of Thailand 
 
Robert Badinter (France) Member of the French Senate and former Minister of 
Justice of France 
 
João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil) Former General Secretary of the Ministry of 
External Relations of Brazil and former Secretary-General of the Organization of 
American States 
 
Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway) Former Prime Minister of Norway and former 
Director-General of the World Health Organization 
 
Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana) Vice-Chairman of the National Development Planning 
Commission of Ghana and former Deputy Director-General of the International 
Labour Organization 
 
Gareth Evans (Australia) President of the International Crisis Group and former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia 
 
David Hannay (United Kingdom of Former Permanent Representative of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland) the United Kingdom to the United Nations and former 
United Kingdom Special Envoy to Cyprus 
 
Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay) President of the Inter-American Development Bank and 
former Minister for Foreign Relations of Uruguay 
 
Amre Moussa (Egypt) Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt 
 
Satish Nambiar (India) Former Lt. General in the Indian Army and Force 
Commander of UNPROFOR 
 
Sadako Ogata (Japan) President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency and 
former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation) Former Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federation 
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Qian Qichen (China) Former Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China 
 
Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for 
HIV/AIDS in Asia and former Executive Director of the United Nations Population 
Fund 
 
Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic Former Prime Minister of the United of 
Tanzania) Republic of Tanzania and former Secretary-General of the Organization of 
African Unity 
 
Brent Scowcroft (United States of America) Former Lt. General, United States Air 
Force, and former United States National Security Adviser 
 
4.  The General Assembly on 3 December 2003 in its resolution5 A/RES/58/16 entitled 
Responding to global threats and challenges welcomed the establishment by the Secretary-
General of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to make 
recommendations for the elements of a collective action, and expressed its readiness to 
consider as a matter of priority at its fifty-ninth session the recommendations of the 
Secretary-General thereon. 
 
5.  The General Assembly on 6 May 2004 decided6 to convene in New York, at the start of its 
sixtieth session, a high level plenary meeting of the Assembly, in which heads of State and 
Government would participate — in other words, a summit — on dates to be decided by the 
Assembly at its present session.  In the Secretary-General’s report7 on the modalities for the 
high level session, he noted that the General Assembly had asked the Secretary-General to 
submit a comprehensive report on the Millennium Declaration. He said that this report would 
be presented in March 2005.  Whilst the report will cover all areas of the Millennium 
Declaration, the Secretary-General said that: 
  
6. The report will also draw, in particular in the area of peace and security, on the 
findings of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which I 
established one year ago and which will submit its report to me on 2 December 2004. 
I intend to transmit the report of the Panel to Member States without delay, together 
with some comments and suggestions concerning the discussion of the 
recommendations of the Panel and the decisions to be taken thereon, outlining, in 
particular, which of the recommendations may require follow-up in the various 
intergovernmental bodies in the United Nations system. 
 
The General Assembly on 17 December 2004 decided8 that the high level plenary meeting of 
the Sixtieth Session would be held on 14 to 16 September 2005 in New York. 
 
                                                 
5 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/16 Responding to global threats and challenges, adopted 3 
December 2004, A/RES/58/16, 26 January 2004. 
6 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/291. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit 
and integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations 
conferences and summits in the economic and social fields, adopted 6 May 2004, A/RES/58/291, 17 May 2004. 
7 United Nations General Assembly, Modalities, format and organization of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of 
the Sixtieth Session of the General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/545, 1 November 2004. 
8 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 59/145. Modalities, format and organization of the High-level 
Plenary Meeting of the Sixtieth Session of the General Assembly, adopted 17 December 2004, A/RES/59/145, 
13 January 2005. 
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6.   The Report of the High Level Panel was issued9 on 2 December 2004.  In his covering 
note the Secretary-General said that he wholly endorsed the core arguments of the High Level 
Panel for “a broader, more comprehensive concept of collective security:  one that tackles 
new and old threats and addresses the security concerns of all States – rich and poor, weak 
and strong.”[Emphasis in original]  The Secretary-General also urged that “we should move 
forward quickly and take action on recommendations wherever we can.” 
 
7.  The Secretary-General’s comprehensive report10 on the Millennium Declaration, 
mentioned above, was presented to the General Assembly on 21 March 2005.  In the 
introduction to this report, the Secretary-General says that he has drawn inspiration from two 
wide-ranging reviews of our global challenges — one from the 16-member High-level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change, whom I asked to make proposals to strengthen our 
collective security system (see A/59/565); and the other from the 250 experts who undertook 
the Millennium Project.  The Secretary-General goes on to state that: 
 
I have resisted the temptation to include all areas in which progress is important or 
desirable. I have limited myself to items on which I believe action is both vital and 
achievable in the coming months. These are reforms that are within reach — reforms 
that are actionable if we can garner the necessary political will. With very few 
exceptions, this is an agenda of highest priorities for September. Many other issues 
will need to be advanced in other forums and on other occasions. 
 
8.  A number of recommendations in the High Level Panel report relate to the States Parties 
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).  Whilst the States Parties to the 
BTWC will be holding a meeting in Geneva on 5 to 9 December 2005, this meeting is held 
under the decision of the Fifth Review Conference that annual meetings would be held 
between the Fifth and Sixth Review Conferences to consider specific topics with the topic for 
2005 being: 
 
v. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists 
 
Although, as at the Meeting of the BTWC States Parties in Geneva on 6 to 10 December 
2004, it is probable that, in the opening plenary meeting of 2005, States Parties will in their 
statements refer to the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, the States Parties will first have the opportunity to consider 
these recommendations at the Sixth Review Conference to be held in 2006. 
 
9.  Although terrorism was a major topic of concern in the High Level Panel report, in this 
Review Conference Paper it is recognised that the counters to threats posed by biological 
weapon attacks – whether by States or by sub-State actors such as terrorist groups – needs to 
be addressed by a multilayered approach or web of assurance – which embraces all possible 
measures.   Any single measure alone will not suffice – it is the mutually reinforcing effect of 
the different elements of the web of assurance that will be effective in countering the threat 
from biological weapons.  
 
                                                 
9 United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
10 United Nations General Assembly, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. 
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10.  It is, however, evident that the High Level Panel’s recommendations particularly insofar 
as they have been incorporated into the Secretary-General’s comprehensive report on the 
Millennium Declaration will receive attention at the General Assembly session commencing 
in September 2005 as well as at the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006.   It is therefore 
timely in this Review Conference Paper to examine those aspects of the High Level Panel 
report and of the subsequent Secretary-General’s comprehensive report on the Millennium 
Declaration relating to the threat from biological weapons and to the recommendations 
related to such weapons. 
 
11.  This Review Conference paper sets out the conclusions and recommendations relating to 
biological weapons first in the High Level Panel’s report, then in the Secretary-General’s 
report of 21 March 2005 and finally in the Secretary-General’s recommendations for decision 
by the Heads of State and Government at the Summit Plenary of the General Assembly on 14 
– 16 September 2005.  These conclusions and recommendations are then analysed from the 
point of view of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the 
reverse order – first the Summit Plenary, then the Secretary-General’s recommendations and 
finally the High Level Panel’s recommendations.  Consideration is given to how these should 
be addressed and taken forward at the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006. 
 
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
 
12.   The High-Level Panel report, A/59/565, embraces a wide range of topics.  In 
considering its report, it needs to be recognised that the Panel covered an extremely broad 
canvas in its six meetings and that the Panel although knowledgeable in many areas could not 
be regarded as expert in every area that it addressed.  However, the Panel were aware of the 
tensions in the areas such as public health and security that they addressed and they were, in 
addition, seeking to take an independent view of the threats, challenges and change11. 
 
13.  The Panel report points out that  
 
The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats 
recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global 
and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its 
own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be 
assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to 
protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours. 
 
It goes on to identify what presents a threat to international security as being: 
 
Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and 
undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to 
international security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the 
world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead: 
 
• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and 
environmental degradation 
• Inter-State conflict 
                                                 
11 High Level Panel research staff, Private communication, 7 April 2005. 
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• Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale 
atrocities 
• Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
• Terrorism 
• Transnational organized crime 
 
14.  In regard to infectious disease and biological weapons, two sections address relevant 
aspects: “III Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation” and “V Nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons.”  Understandably, the High Level Panel 
report is compressed and deals with many topics in only a few paragraphs. 
  
Infectious Disease 
 
15.  In regard to infectious disease, the report in Section III states that: 
 
68. The fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria depends on capable, 
responsible States with functioning public health systems. The absence of health 
facilities is the primary factor spurring the proliferation of malaria. Funding gaps are 
preventing health-sector reforms in many heavily burdened countries, particularly 
those in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Inconsistent or partial treatment, 
resulting from insufficient funding, has allowed new strains of tuberculosis to develop 
that are far more difficult to treat. Even when programme funding for HIV/AIDS is 
available, inadequate or non-existent health facilities in the poorest areas of sub-
Saharan Africa hinder programmes from being effectively or sustainably 
implemented. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and 
local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to 
rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. 
[Emphasis in original] 
 
69. Such efforts should be undertaken simultaneously with improving global disease 
monitoring capabilities. This is triply imperative — as a means of fighting new 
emerging infectious disease, defending against the threat of biological terrorism and 
building effective, responsible States. Members of the World Health Assembly 
should provide greater resources to the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. [Emphasis 
in original] 
 
70. In extreme cases of threat posed by a new emerging infectious disease or 
intentional release of an infectious agent, there may be a need for cooperation 
between WHO and the Security Council in establishing effective quarantine measures.  
 
16.  Although mention is made elsewhere in the report to food insecurity, it is notable that the 
emphasis adopted by the High Level Panel in regard to infectious disease has focussed 
exclusively on the dangers of disease as a threat to humans and the potential threat to animals 
and plants is not mentioned.  It can be speculated that this may, in part, reflect the 
participation in the High Level Panel of the past Director General of the World Health 
Organization (WHO).  In addition, the High Level Panel in its paragraph 70 may have been 
seeking to deal with an outbreak of disease with overwhelming consequences and may have 
considered that such circumstances may necessitate cooperation between the WHO and the 
Security Council.  It is also possible that the High Level Panel considered that if the danger 
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from a deliberate outbreak of human disease was sufficiently great – at a very high threshold 
– then the circumstances may necessitate cooperation between the WHO and the Security 
Council.  Whilst the High Level Panel report refers in several places to the WHO, there is no 
mention of the comparable animal and plant health organizations – the OIE and the FAO. 
This failure to address overwhelming outbreaks of animal or plant disease may reflect a 
perception that the danger from human disease outbreaks has greater impact than animal or 
plant disease outbreaks. 
 
Chemical and Biological Weapons 
 
17.  In regard to chemical and biological weapons, the report in Section V Nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons addresses: 
 
A.  The threats we face 
 
B.  Meeting the challenge of prevention 
 
1.  Better strategies to reduce demand 
2.  Better strategies to reduce supply 
3.  Better enforcement capability 
4.  Better public health defences. 
 
Both chemical and biological weapons are considered together in the High Level Panel 
report.  This Review Conference Paper considers each of these sections in turn. 
 
18.   In regard to the threats we face, the Panel states that: 
 
114. Chemical and biological materials also pose a growing threat: they share with 
nuclear weapons the awful potential of being used in a single attack to inflict mass 
casualties. Chemical agents are widespread and relatively easy to acquire and 
weaponize. There are almost 6,000 industrial chemical facilities worldwide, posing 
potential targets and opportunities for the acquisition of materials. Chemical weapon 
States have lagged behind in the destruction of chemical weapons scheduled by the 
Chemical Weapons Convention: of the 70,000 metric tons of declared weapons 
agents, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has 
verified the destruction of only 9,600, and if the current pace persists, the 
Convention’s goal of the complete destruction of chemical weapons agents will not be 
met even by the agreed extended deadline of 2012. 
 
115. While rapid growth and scientific advances in the biotechnology sector hold out 
the prospect of prevention and cure for many diseases, they also increase 
opportunities for the development of deadly new ones. Dramatic advances in 
recombinant DNA technology and direct genetic manipulation raise the spectre of 
“designer bugs”, which may be developed to reconstruct eradicated diseases and to 
resist existing vaccinations, antibiotics and other treatments. There are countless 
fermentation, medical and research facilities equipped to produce biological agents.  
Meanwhile, the biological toxin ricin has been discovered in several terrorist 
workshops. Unlike anthrax, which can be treated by antibiotics, ricin has no antidote 
and is lethal to humans in quantities smaller than the size of a pinhead. Use of similar 
materials to cause deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease could prove equally if 
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not more lethal than a nuclear detonation. Under worst-case assumptions, an attack 
using only one gram of weaponized smallpox could produce between 100,000 and 
1,000,000 fatalities. 
 
116. That a high-damage attack has not occurred is not a cause for complacency but 
a call for urgent prevention. 
 
The potential danger from biological weapons is recognised both in the opening sentence of 
para. 114 and in the body of para. 115 whilst para. 116 rightly calls for urgent prevention. 
 
19.  Insofar as meeting the challenge of prevention, the Panel states that: 
 
117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should 
feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should 
contain global instruments that operate on the supply side — to limit the capacity of 
both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and the materials and expertise 
needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement 
activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer 
must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence. 
 
20.  This approach is essentially identical to the web of deterrence or web of assurance that I 
have long advocated12: 
 
There continues to be a vital need in every country for all the elements of the web of 
assurance -- to assure the public that all reasonable steps have been taken both 
nationally and internationally.  The web of assurance is made up of the following 
elements: 
 
a.  International and national regimes that totally prohibit chemical and 
biological weapons.  
 -- Universality of the BTWC and CWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
 -- Withdrawal of all reservations to the Geneva Protocol   
-- Legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
BTWC 
-- National implementing legislation for BTWC and CWC in all 
countries 
 
b.  Controls of dangerous pathogens and chemicals 
 -- Addressing handling, use, storage and transfer both nationally and 
 internationally 
 
c.  Broadband protective measures 
 -- Preparedness, detection, diagnosis and medical countermeasures 
                                                 
12 Most recently in Graham S. Pearson, 21 Years of CBW Protection: A Changing World, 8th International 
Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Agents, Gothenburg, Sweden, 2-6 June 2004.  Also 
available in Bradford Briefing Paper (Second Series) No. 14, Two Decades of Strengthening CBW Prohibitions:  
Priorities for the BTWC in the 21st Century, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 
2004.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
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 -- Preparedness before and after release 
 
d.  Determined national and international response to use or threat of use 
 -- Diplomatic actions, sanctions, military intervention 
 -- Security Council P5 need to recognise their responsibilities 
 
A strong public commitment to such a web of assurance both nationally and 
internationally provides two immense benefits -- first to deter the would-be user and 
second to reassure the public both nationally and internationally that all reasonable 
steps are being taken to ensure their safety and security. 
 
21.  In considering better strategies to reduce demand, the Panel report has seven paragraphs 
addressing nuclear weapons and one paragraph relating to biological weapons which says: 
 
126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further 
strengthened, and the long-standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the 
overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible 
verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. 
States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize 
membership. [Emphasis in original] 
 
22.  On better strategies to reduce supply, the Panel report has some eight paragraphs relating 
to nuclear weapons, three which relate to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and one 
relating specifically to biological weapons.  Those relating to nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons are: 
 
133. In order to reinforce international legal provisions against the illicit trafficking 
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, ongoing negotiations at 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend the 1988 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation should be 
completed in a timely manner. The Security Council may need to be prepared to 
consider mandatory action if progress in the Convention negotiations is 
unsatisfactory. 
 
and 
 
135. Urgent short-term action is needed to defend against the possible terrorist use of 
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. High priority must be 
accorded to consolidating, securing, and when possible eliminating potentially 
hazardous materials, and implementing effective export controls. To that end, we 
welcome the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which facilitates (a) the reduction of 
global highly enriched uranium stockpiles, (b) the conversion of HEU research 
reactors to “proliferation-resistant” reactors, and (c) the “downblending” of existing 
HEU. The proposed timeline for implementing the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative should be halved from 10 to 5 years. [Emphasis in original] 
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136. The Security Council, acting under its resolution 1540 (2004), can offer States 
model legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls, and by 
2006 develop minimum standards for United Nations Member State implementation. 
To achieve that goal, the implementation committee of Council resolution 1540 
(2004) should establish a permanent liaison with IAEA, OPCW and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group. 
 
23.  The paragraph relating specifically to biological weapons is: 
 
137. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should also 
negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and 
establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. Within a 
designated time frame, States parties to the Convention should refrain from 
participating in such biotechnology commerce with non-members. [Emphasis in 
original] 
 
It is noted that para. 137 relates specifically to biological agents and that there is no parallel 
relating to chemical agents other than the recognition of the steps that the Security Council can 
take under SCR 1540 (2004) and the proposal in para. 136 for establishing a permanent liaison 
with the OPCW.  There is, somewhat surprisingly, no parallel proposal for establishing any 
permanent liaison with the States Parties to the BTWC.  Whilst there may currently not be any 
OPBW or even an interim supportive institution for the BTWC, this is something which could 
be remedied relatively easily13 by the States Parties to the BTWC and it is regretted that the 
High Level Panel has not recommended establishment of permanent liaison with a future 
secretariat for the BTWC. 
 
24.   In a like vein, it is noted that this section in addressing nuclear weapons includes a 
proposal relating to withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in para. 134: 
 
134. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides the 
right of withdrawal from the Treaty, States should be urged not to do so. Those who 
withdraw should be held responsible for violations committed while still a party to the 
Treaty. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the 
Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of 
Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by 
IAEA should be withdrawn.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
It is observed that both the BTWC and the CWC include Articles which provide a right of 
withdrawal from them.  It is regretted that the High Level Panel has not used parallel language 
urging the States not to withdraw from the BTWC and the CWC and has not recommended 
that a State’s notice of withdrawal from the BTWC or from the CWC should prompt 
immediate verification of its compliance with these Conventions, if necessary mandated by the 
Security Council. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC:  Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
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25.  In regard to better enforcement capability, the High Level Panel stated that: 
 
139. The Security Council today has few arrows in its quiver other than sanctions and 
military force to enforce non-proliferation agreements. Moreover, a special referral 
to the Security Council that results in no action is worse than no referral.  The ability 
of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential instances of 
proliferation should be strengthened. 
 
140. To that end, links between IAEA and OPCW and the Security Council must also 
be strengthened. The Directors-General of IAEA and OPCW should be invited by 
the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and 
verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might 
fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
141. The Security Council should also be prepared to deploy inspection capacities for 
suspected nuclear and chemical violations, drawing on the capacities of IAEA and 
OPCW. Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the 
Secretary-General’s roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain 
independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors 
should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in the 
event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below. 
 
It is again noted that the language in para. 140 whilst addressing the IAEA and the OPCW 
excludes any parallel consideration of the BTWC14.  As noted earlier, whilst there may 
currently not be any OPBW or even an interim supportive institution for the BTWC, this is 
something which could be remedied relatively easily by the States Parties to the BTWC and it 
is regretted that the High Level Panel has not recommended that the head of a future 
secretariat for the BTWC should also report twice-yearly to the Security Council on the status 
of verification processes as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short 
of an actual breach of the BTWC.   Although it might be argued that there are currently no 
verification processes under the BTWC, the opportunity could still be taken at the present time 
to report on the status of the annual confidence-building measure submissions by the States 
Parties and at a later stage to report on any eventually agreed verification or compliance 
measures.   Such a step would help the Security Council to generate credible information 
about States Parties as recommended in para. 139. 
 
26.  In regard to the recommendation in para. 141 regarding use of the Secretary-General’s 
roster of inspectors for biological weapons, note should be taken of the outcome of the 
Meeting of States Parties to the BTWC in December 2004 which specifically considered: 
 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
                                                 
14 It should, however, be noted that toxins are covered by both the CWC and the BTWC and consequently it 
could be expected that the Director-General of the OPCW could cover verification processes and serious 
concerns relating to both chemicals and toxins. 
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and in its final report15 concluded that: 
 
the States Parties recognised that: 
 
a) capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of 
cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of 
disease promote the object and purpose of the Convention; 
 
b) States Parties’ national preparedness and arrangements substantially 
contribute to international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
c) the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and 
endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution A/Res/45/57, represents an 
international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of 
biological or toxin weapons. 
 
21. The States Parties consequently agreed on the value of: 
 
a) continuing to develop their own national capacities for response, 
investigation and mitigation, in cooperation with the relevant international 
and regional organisations, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and 
encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States Parties to do the 
same; 
 
b) the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, the further 
development of current procedures for the provision of assistance, by those in 
a position to do so, to States Parties in cases of alleged use of biological 
weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. 
 
27.  It should, however, be noted that the outcome of the Meeting of States Parties in 
December 2004 had failed16 to reach consensus on the proposal put forward by the Chairman 
that: 
 
Recognising that the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in 
A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution A/Res/45/57, 
represents the only existing international institutional mechanism for investigating 
cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, States Parties authorise the 
Chairman to write on their behalf to the Secretary-General to request that he review 
and consider updating the investigation mechanism … 
 
                                                 
15 United Nations, Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Second Meeting, Geneva, 6 - 10 December 2004, BWC/MSP/2004/3, 14 
December 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
 
16 Graham S. Pearson, The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, Report from Geneva, 
Review No 22, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 66, December 2004.  Available at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp 
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and on the proposal that the outcome paragraph would have included the following: 
 
b) consideration being given by the United Nations General Assembly to reviewing 
the Secretary General's mechanism for investigation of cases of alleged use of 
biological or toxin weapons, and the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, 
any actions that may be taken in this regard, bearing in mind that any investigation of 
alleged use of biological or toxin weapons would be of direct relevance to violations 
of Article I of the Convention; 
 
Consequently, the recommendation in the High Level Panel report is welcomed. 
 
28.  On better public health defences, the High Level Panel stated: 
 
142. Scientific advancements in biotechnology and the ubiquity of facilities capable  
of producing biological agents circumscribe prospects for the elimination of 
biological weapons and complicate verification efforts. But unlike nuclear weapons, 
many (though not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and 
effective responses (including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treatment). Well 
prepared societies may thus be able to avoid the worst-case scenarios of biological 
attacks. 
 
143. However, at present, international aid for infectious disease monitoring, 
detection and response is lacking, security planning and spending are poorly 
coordinated with health-care policies and budgets, and there is insufficient 
understanding that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-defence the 
most viable option against the likelihood of attack. 
 
144. Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release 
of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an 
infectious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the 
Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious or 
overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security Council 
should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to deploy experts 
reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International Health Regulations do 
not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the 
Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance. In the event that 
a State is unable to adequately quarantine large numbers of potential carriers, the 
Security Council should be prepared to support international action to assist in 
cordon operations. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director- 
General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a 
suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
29.  It is noted that para. 142 makes the statement that unlike nuclear weapons, many (though 
not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and effective responses 
(including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treatment).   This is a surprising statement – 
which is in sharp contrast to the much more accurate assessment of biological weapons made 
in the earlier section on the threats we face, notably in para. 114 and 115 which recognize 
that “deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease could prove equally if not more lethal than a 
nuclear detonation.” Medical countermeasures such as vaccines and effective responses are 
only available for very few of the known biological agents and even there the vaccines are 
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not regarded as being suitable for much of the civil population.  In any event, medical 
countermeasures and vaccines are not, by themselves, a solution.   It may be that the High 
Level Panel was seeking to draw the distinction between nuclear and biological weapon 
attacks in that the response to biological weapon attacks can have a major effect in 
mitigation. Whilst this is true, it is considered that the High Level Panel was unduly 
optimistic and incorrect in its judgments expressed in the last two sentences of para. 142.   
 
30.  The statement made in para. 144 is also treading on dangerous ground saying that there is 
a need for the WHO Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to keep the Security 
Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.   
Throughout the past decade, it has become increasingly evident that the effectiveness of the 
World Health Organization rests on its political neutrality and the widespread recognition 
that its purpose is to provide assistance to its member States when they are faced with 
outbreaks of disease.  Whilst the High Level Panel may have been seeking to address a 
situation in which there is an overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease – and suggesting 
that in such circumstances, the WHO and the Security Council should work together – the 
language actually used in para. 144 refers to “any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of 
infectious disease” [Emphasis added].  The recommendation thus applies to any suspicious 
outbreak and as such is flawed.  The ability of the WHO to carry out its primary mission will 
be jeopardized if there should be any suggestion that the Director-General of the WHO is 
going to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious … outbreak of infectious 
disease. [Emphasis added].  It is considered that the High Level Panel has failed to recognize 
the dangers that its proposals in para. 144 present to the primary mission of the WHO.  In 
addition, as already noted earlier, the absence of any consideration of animal and plant 
infectious disease outbreaks – or of the OIE or FAO – indicates a limited appreciation of the 
threat posed by biological weapons. 
 
31.  There is, however, a much sounder argument that any overwhelming outbreak of disease, 
without regard to its cause, in humans, animals or plants may well merit urgent international 
action to mobilize aid and take steps to contain the outbreak that could be considerably 
facilitated by the Security Council.  It is considered that it would have been much better in 
para. 144 to delete any mention of “suspicious or” and have extended the liaison to the 
Director-Generals of the WHO, OIE and FAO as appropriate. 
 
32. The statement in para. 143 that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-
defence the most viable option appears to recognize that the pace of development in 
biotechnology and the life sciences is such that the uncertain future necessitates public health 
defences that are ongoing and not dormant – and hence the reference to active bio-defence is 
taken as referring to a viable public, animal and plant health defence programme that is 
adjusted in the light of the likely dangers. 
 
33.  The High Level Panel is likely to have recognized the benefits that building public health 
defences can bring to improving the well-being of people around the globe in all countries – 
and that building public health defences also helps to counter the threat posed by biological 
weapons.   It would, however, have been better if the High Level Panel report had clearly 
stated the benefits of building public, animal and plant health defences around the world and 
recognized that such enhanced public, animal and plant health defences would also counter 
the threat from biological weapons.  Rather than jeopardizing the neutrality of the WHO 
through suggesting the linkage to the Security Council, it would have been prudent if the 
High Level Panel had recognized that strengthening the capabilities of the WHO, OIE and 
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FAO would improve the information available to all the Member States to counter human, 
animal and plant disease outbreaks.  It would then be open for individual Security Council 
members to have judged whether a particular outbreak merited consideration by the Security 
Council for whatever reason. 
 
34.  Analysis.   In considering the conclusions and recommendations of the High Level Panel 
it needs to be born in mind that the Panel covered an extremely broad canvas during the 
course of its six meetings and that none of the members of the Panel were particularly expert 
in the field of chemical or biological weapons.   However, they were in areas aware of the 
tensions relating to particular aspects such as public health and security and made 
recommendations accordingly.17  
 
Secretary-General’s Comprehensive Report on the Millennium Declaration 
 
35.  As noted earlier, the Secretary-General in his comprehensive report on the Millennium 
Declaration issued on 21 March 2005 has drawn inspiration from the High Level Panel 
report.  However, in doing so, he has limited himself to items on which he believes action is 
both vital and achievable in the coming months. As he said these are reforms that are within 
reach — reforms that are actionable if we can garner the necessary political will. 
 
II Freedom from Want 
 
36.  In the report in Section II Freedom from Want a subsection addresses Infectious disease 
surveillance and monitoring and states that: 
 
64. The rapid response to SARS also showed that the spread of infectious disease can 
be contained when effective global institutions, such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO), work in close partnership with functioning national health 
agencies and expert technical institution. No State could have achieved this degree of 
containment on its own. To strengthen existing mechanisms for timely and effective 
international cooperation, I call on Member States to agree on the revision of the 
International Health Regulations at the World Health Assembly to be held in May 
2005. To contain the risk of future outbreaks, greater resources should also be given 
to the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network so that it can coordinate 
the response of a broad international partnership in support of national health 
surveillance and response systems.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
III Freedom from Fear 
 
37.  In his report in section III Freedom from Fear he sets out A vision of collective security 
which includes: 
 
78. The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just 
international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and 
environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. 
All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of 
them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system. 
                                                 
17 High Level Panel research staff, Private communication, 7 April 2005. 
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He goes on to recognise that in our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected 
and as a consequence: 
 
81.  On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, 
the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that 
whatever threatens one threatens all. Once we understand this, we have no choice but 
to tackle the whole range of threats. … Moreover, we must address all these threats 
preventively, acting at a sufficiently early stage with the full range of available 
instruments. 
 
82. We need to ensure that States abide by the security treaties they have signed so 
that all can continue to reap the benefit. More consistent monitoring, more effective 
implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement are essential if States are 
to have confidence in multilateral mechanisms and use them to avoid conflict. 
 
83. These are not theoretical issues but issues of deadly urgency. If we do not reach a 
consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not have another chance. 
… 
 
38.  In regard to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Secretary-General in the 
vision of collective security states that; 
 
85. We must revitalize our multilateral frameworks for handling threats from nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. The threat posed by these weapons is not limited to 
terrorist use. The existence of multilateral instruments to promote disarmament and 
prevent proliferation among States has been central to the maintenance of 
international peace and security ever since those instruments were agreed. But they 
are now in danger of erosion. They must be revitalized to ensure continued progress 
on disarmament and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, 
especially in the nuclear field. 
 
39.  Also in section III Freedom from Fear, another subsection addresses Nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons.   The first four paragraphs deal with nuclear weapons, the fifth with 
delivery means, the sixth with chemical weapons and the seventh and eighth with biological 
weapons and the final paragraph with how the Security Council could be better informed 
about nuclear, chemical and biological threats. 
 
40.   On delivery means, the Secretary-General states that: 
 
101. The availability of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater accuracy is 
of growing concern to many States, as is the spread of shoulder-fired missiles which 
could be used by terrorists. Member States should adopt effective national export 
controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles, as well as a ban on 
transferring any of them to non-State actors. The Security Council should also 
consider adopting a resolution aimed at making it harder for terrorists to acquire or 
use shoulder-fired missiles. [Emphasis in original] 
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41.  In regard to chemical weapons, the Secretary-General focuses on the scheduled 
destruction of chemical weapons as well universality of accession to the CWC: 
 
102. Where progress has been made, it should be consolidated. The 1997 Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction calls for the complete elimination and destruction 
of chemical weapons by all States parties, thus offering a historic opportunity to 
complete a task begun more than a century ago. States parties to the Convention on 
Chemical Weapons should recommit themselves to achieving the scheduled 
destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. I call upon all States to accede 
immediately to the Convention. [Emphasis in original] 
 
42.  On biological weapons, the Secretary-General looks ahead to the 2006 Review 
Conference, universality of accession to the BTWC as well as increased transparency of bio-
defence programmes: 
 
103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction14 has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has 
been strengthened further through recent annual meetings. States parties should 
consolidate the results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and 
commit themselves to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the 
Convention and to increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes. 
[Emphasis in original] 
 
In addition, he recommends strengthening of the capability of the Secretary-General to 
investigate suspected use of biological weapons: 
 
104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The 
capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological agents, 
as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should be strengthened 
to incorporate the latest technology and expertise; and the Security Council should 
make use of that capability, consistent with Security Council resolution 620 (1988). 
 
43.  Finally, in regard to how the Security Council could be better informed about nuclear, 
chemical and biological threats: 
 
105. Indeed, the Security Council must be better informed on all matters relevant to 
nuclear, chemical and biological threats. I encourage the Council to regularly invite 
the Director-General of IAEA and the Director-General of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and 
verification processes. And I myself stand ready, in consultation with the Director-
General of the World Health Organization, to use my powers under Article 99 of the 
Charter of the United Nations to call to the attention of the Security Council any 
overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens international peace and 
security. 
 
V Strengthening the United Nations 
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44.  In another section of the report V Strengthening the United Nations there is a particular 
recommendation relating to the Secretariat that has potential to have an impact on the regimes 
against chemical and biological weapons.  This is the recommendation urging that all 
mandates over five years old be reviewed to see whether they are still genuinely required: 
 
187. Member States also have a central role to play in ensuring that the 
Organization’s mandates stay current. I therefore ask the General Assembly to 
review all mandates older than five years to see whether the activities concerned are 
still genuinely needed or whether the resources assigned to them can be reallocated 
in response to new and emerging challenges.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
Secretary-General’s Recommendations for Decision by Heads of State and Government 
 
45.   The Secretary-General’s progress report concludes with an Annex entitled For Decision 
by Heads of State and Government at the Summit to be held at the United Nations in New 
York on 14 to 16 September 2005.   The Annex in its introductory paragraphs states: 
 
3. No State can stand wholly alone in today’s world. We all share responsibility for 
each other’s development and security. Collective strategies, collective institutions 
and collective action are indispensable. 
 
4. Heads of State and Government must therefore agree on the nature of the threats 
and opportunities before us and take decisive action. 
 
It then goes on in its section II. Freedom from fear to state: 
 
6. In order to provide effective collective security in the twenty-first century, I urge 
Heads of State and Government to pledge concerted action against the whole range of 
threats to international peace and security, and in particular to: 
 
(a) Affirm and commit themselves to implementing a new security consensus 
based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, 
security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no State can 
protect itself acting entirely alone and that all States need an equitable, 
efficient and effective collective security system; and therefore commit 
themselves to agreeing on, and implementing, comprehensive strategies for 
confronting the whole range of threats, from international war through 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, State collapse and civil conflict to 
deadly infectious disease, extreme poverty and the destruction of the 
environment; 
 
(b) Pledge full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to further 
strengthen the multilateral framework for non-proliferation and disarmament, 
and in particular: 
 
… 
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(v) Commit themselves to further strengthening the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention; 
 
(vi) Urge all chemical-weapon States to expedite the scheduled 
destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles; 
 
Analysis 
 
46.  Consideration can now be given to these various recommendations – those to be 
considered by the Heads of States and Government at the summit on 14 – 16 September 
2005, those made in the Secretary-General’s progress report issued on 21 March 2005 and 
those made in the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel report issued on 2 December 2004.  
It needs, however, to be born in mind that the recommendations put forward for the summit 
on 14 – 16 September 2005 as well as those made in the Secretary-General’s progress report 
issued on 21 March 2005 are qualified by the Secretary-General’s covering words that: 
 
5.  In the present report, I have resisted the temptation to include all areas in which 
progress is important or desirable. I have limited myself to items on which I believe 
action is both vital and achievable in the coming months. These are reforms that are 
within reach — reforms that are actionable if we can garner the necessary political 
will. With very few exceptions, this is an agenda of highest priorities for September. 
Many other issues will need to be advanced in other forums and on other occasions. 
 
In other words, they are focussed on those achievable in the coming months and the other 
issues will need to be addressed in other forums. 
 
Summit Recommendations 
 
47.   The summit recommendations relating to biological weapons are relatively modest.  
First the call for the Heads of State and Government to pledge concerted action against the 
whole range of threats to international peace and security and for them to affirm and commit 
themselves to implementing a new security consensus based on the recognition that threats 
are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent, 
that no State can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all States need an equitable, 
efficient and effective collective security system; should serve to help achieve the right 
environment in which the regime countering biological and toxin weapons can be 
strengthened effectively. 
 
48.  The second relevant summit recommendation calls for the Heads of State and 
Government to pledge full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention in order to further strengthen the multilateral framework for non-
proliferation and disarmament.   This should provide a stimulus to all States Parties to enact 
national legislation to implement the BTWC in accordance with Article IV and to comply 
fully with all the articles of the Convention. 
 
49.   The third relevant summit recommendation calls for the Heads of State and Government 
to commit themselves to further strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  
This should help to ensure that all States Parties approach the BTWC Sixth Review 
Conference in 2006 with a political commitment to further strengthen the Convention. 
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Secretary-General Recommendations in A/59/2005 
 
50.  The Secretary-General recommendations relating to biological weapons are primarily in 
the section of his report dealing with III Freedom from fear.     There is, however, one in the 
previous section II Freedom from want that is relevant.  This relates to infectious disease and 
monitoring where the Secretary-General stated that: 
 
64. The rapid response to SARS also showed that the spread of infectious disease can 
be contained when effective global institutions, such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO), work in close partnership with functioning national health 
agencies and expert technical institutions. No State could have achieved this degree 
of containment on its own. To strengthen existing mechanisms for timely and 
effective international cooperation, I call on Member States to agree on the revision 
of the International Health Regulations at the World Health Assembly to be held in 
May 2005. To contain the risk of future outbreaks, greater resources should also be 
given to the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network so that it can 
coordinate the response of a broad international partnership in support of national 
health surveillance and response systems.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
This recommendation is fully supported as it has not suggested any action that is contrary to 
the primary role of the WHO – and, in contrast to the recommendations of the High Level 
Panel, it has not suggested entangling the WHO in security matters which can only put the 
primary role of the WHO at risk. 
 
51.   In the section dealing with III Freedom from fear the Secretary-General rightly points 
out the interconnectedness of the threats that we face: 
 
81. On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, the 
first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that 
whatever threatens one threatens all. Once we understand this, we have no choice but 
to tackle the whole range of threats. We must respond to HIV/AIDS as robustly as we 
do to terrorism and to poverty as effectively as we do to proliferation. We must strive 
just as hard to eliminate the threat of small arms and light weapons as we do to 
eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we must address all 
these threats preventively, acting at a sufficiently early stage with the full range of 
available instruments. 
 
The point that whatever threatens one threatens all applies to all States – the largest as well 
as the smallest – and should serve as an impetus for all States to engage constructively in 
making the world safer for all of us.  No State can afford to say that this doesn’t apply to us 
or that our national measures will suffice. 
 
52.  The Secretary-General goes on to say that: 
 
82. We need to ensure that States abide by the security treaties they have signed so 
that all can continue to reap the benefit. More consistent monitoring, more effective 
implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement are essential if States are 
to have confidence in multilateral mechanisms and use them to avoid conflict. 
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This again rightly puts the emphasis on more consistent monitoring and more effective 
implementation of the existing multilateral treaties.   This again should help to ensure that the 
States Parties to the BTWC approach the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 constructively. 
 
53.   He goes on to emphasize the importance of revitalizing the multilateral frameworks for 
handling threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons: 
 
85. We must revitalize our multilateral frameworks for handling threats from nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. The threat posed by these weapons is not limited to 
terrorist use. The existence of multilateral instruments to promote disarmament and 
prevent proliferation among States has been central to the maintenance of 
international peace and security ever since those instruments were agreed. But they 
are now in danger of erosion. They must be revitalized to ensure continued progress 
on disarmament and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, 
especially in the nuclear field. 
 
These words are particularly true in regard to the BTWC – following the failure of the 
negotiations of a legally binding instrument in 2001 and the subsequent collapse of the Fifth 
Review Conference, this has been a Convention in crisis and with a real danger of erosion of 
its comprehensive prohibitions which have been extended and strengthened over the years by 
successive Review Conferences.  There is a real necessity for the BTWC regime to be 
revitalized at the Sixth Review Conference – and this is achievable if all States Parties are 
indeed determined to maximise the benefits from the Convention regime. 
 
54.  The Secretary-General has one paragraph making recommendations directly relating to 
the BTWC: 
 
103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has been 
strengthened further through recent annual meetings. States parties should 
consolidate the results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and 
commit themselves to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the 
Convention and to increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes. 
[Emphasis in original]. 
 
This paragraph addresses the current situation in regard to the BTWC and makes no reference 
to past failures.  It rightly emphasizes the importance of consolidating the results of the annual 
meetings at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 – which is precisely what the mandate for 
the annual meetings requires: 
 
(e) The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings and decide 
on any further action. 
 
It also rightly calls upon the States Parties to commit themselves to further measures to 
strengthen the Convention.   Interestingly, this does not echo the recommendations made in 
the High Level Panel report. 
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55.  The urging of all States to accede immediately to the Convention is welcomed.  This 
reflects the call that has been frequently made by the States Parties with a recent example 
being the joint statement issued by the three BTWC Depositary States – the Russian 
Federation, the UK and the USA –to mark the thirtieth anniversary on 26 March 2005 of the 
entry into force of the Convention which said inter alia: 
 
We call on all States Not Party to the BWC to join promptly and thereby strengthen 
the global effort to counter proliferation. 
 
56.  The final part of this Secretary-General’s recommendation calls upon all States to 
increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes is not developed from the High Level 
Panel report which is silent on the topic of bio-defence apart from noting that an inevitable, 
new biological future makes active bio-defence the most viable option against the likelihood 
of attack.  It seems probable that the High Level Panel in referring to active bio-defence was 
making the point that public, animal and plant health defence programmes need to be 
ongoing and not dormant – hence the use of the term “active”. The Secretary-General’s 
recommendation would appear to reflect the concerns that have been expressed in the last few 
years about activities which have been carried out in the biological defence programme of 
one State Party in particular – the United States.  It could also reflect the fact that public, 
animal and plant health defence programmes to counter disease outbreaks are effectively the 
same whether mounted by health departments or defence departments – and transparency of 
such programmes is necessary to build confidence between States Parties.  However, the 
decision of the United States to post its CBM return on the internet is greatly welcomed and 
gives leadership to other States Parties – and other States Parties are encouraged to do 
likewise by posting their CBM returns on the internet.  The States Parties to the BTWC are 
all politically committed to making annual submissions under the Confidence-Building 
Measures agreed in 1986 and extended in 1991.  One such CBM requires an annual 
declaration about national biological defence programmes.  It would have been more 
effective if the Secretary-General had called for all States Parties to the BTWC to make 
complete and timely annual CBM submissions rather than singling out bio-defence for 
attention. 
   
57.  The Secretary-General then goes on to address how the biological security regime might 
be bolstered: 
 
104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The 
capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological agents, 
as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should be strengthened 
to incorporate the latest technology and expertise; and the Security Council should 
make use of that capability, consistent with Security Council resolution 620 (1988). 
 
Interestingly, whilst referring to the biological security regime, this paragraph also does not 
pick up on the recommendation made by the High Level Panel calling for a new bio-security 
protocol.   Rather, this paragraph is developed from the High Level Panel paragraph 141 that; 
 
141. The Security Council should also be prepared to deploy inspection capacities for 
suspected nuclear and chemical violations, drawing on the capacities of IAEA and 
OPCW. Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the 
Secretary-General’s roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain 
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independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors 
should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in the 
event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below. 
 
58.  As already noted earlier, the Meeting of the States Parties to the BTWC at their meeting 
in 2004 had failed to agree on how to take forward the ideas discussed at their meeting on 
strengthening the Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigating the alleged use of 
biological or toxin weapons and had been unable to agree to 
 
b) consideration being given by the United Nations General Assembly to reviewing 
the Secretary General's mechanism for investigation of cases of alleged use of 
biological or toxin weapons, and the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, 
any actions that may be taken in this regard, bearing in mind that any investigation of 
alleged use of biological or toxin weapons would be of direct relevance to violations 
of Article I of the Convention; 
 
59.  The Secretary-General’s recommendation in para. 104 that his capability to investigate 
suspected use should be strengthened to incorporate the latest technology and expertise and 
that the Security Council should make use of that capability is welcomed.  In considering 
how to take this forward, consideration should be given to the possible use of the capabilities 
of UNMOVIC18 which has a trained roster of qualified inspectors who could, with an 
appropriate mandate, carry out the strengthened capability required by the Secretary-General.  
It needs to be stressed that merely updating the existing lists of available experts and 
laboratories, that States have advised the Secretary-General that they could make available, 
would not suffice.  It is now evident from the experience gained over the past twenty years 
that any qualified inspectors must be trained and have experience of working as a team and 
further that any laboratories that may be called upon to analyse samples collected by such a 
team must use analytical techniques that have previously been validated through blind testing 
of samples.   And these are the capabilities that UNMOVIC currently has and is maintaining.  
 
61.  The Secretary-General goes on to make a further recommendation in regard to how the 
Security Council might be better informed on all matters relevant to nuclear, biological and 
chemical threats: 
 
105. Indeed, the Security Council must be better informed on all matters relevant to 
nuclear, chemical and biological threats. I encourage the Council to regularly invite 
the Director-General of IAEA and the Director-General of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and 
verification processes. And I myself stand ready, in consultation with the Director-
General of the World Health Organization, to use my powers under Article 99 of the 
Charter of the United Nations to call to the attention of the Security Council any 
overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens international peace and 
security. 
  
The proposals for the Director Generals of the IAEA and the OPCW to regularly brief the 
Security Council on the status of safeguards and verification processes is sound.  What is 
needed is a parallel recommendation in regard to the BTWC.  Although it could be argued 
that there is currently no such parallel body, this has failed to recognize that the States Parties 
                                                 
18 Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, in press.  
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to the BTWC were on the brink of agreeing a small secretariat for the BTWC at the Third 
Review Conference in 1991.   The institutional deficit of the BTWC has long been 
recognized and proposals have been put forward19 as to how this might be resolved at the 
BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006.   One such option would be for the Sixth Review 
Conference to authorize its Bureau to remain in existence between the Review Conferences 
and to hold regular meetings in the inter Review Conference years.  Consequently, the 
President of successive Review Conferences could provide a parallel to the Director Generals 
of the IAEA and the OPCW to regularly brief the Security Council until such time as there is 
a parallel organization for the BTWC to the OPCW for the CWC.   As has been pointed out20, 
such a proposal to provide an interim parallel for the BTWC is fully within the power of the 
Sixth Review Conference to authorise. 
 
62.  The ideas put forward by the Secretary-General in the final sentence of para. 105 are 
verging on dangerous ground.  Whilst the language in paragraph 105 in regard to “any 
overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease” is unexceptional, care needs to be taken as to 
how the words “that threatens international peace and security” are interpreted.  Any 
attempt to involve the WHO in a process related to alerting the Security Council on matters 
related to biological threats must be resisted as it could only harm the effectiveness of the 
WHO which must protect its role as the international body that assists all its member States 
in countering the threats posed by disease. 
 
63.  In any event, these ideas are flawed as they solely refer to the WHO and make no 
reference to the parallel organizations dealing with animal and plant health – the OIE and the 
FAO, especially as overwhelming outbreaks of animal and plant disease can have immense 
economic impact.   There is much to be said for the ideas set out above for remedying the 
institutional deficit of the BTWC as any such solution could be mandated to brief the 
Security Council on biological threats to humans, animals and plants as the BTWC prohibits 
all such weapons. 
 
High Level Panel Recommendations in A/59/565 
 
64.  Although some of the High Level Panel’s recommendations have been incorporated into 
the Secretary-General’s progress report on 21 March 2005, it needs to be recalled that his 
report limited consideration to items on which he believed action is both vital and achievable 
in the coming months.   As the first opportunity at which the States Parties to the BTWC can 
consider the recommendations made by the High Level Panel is at the Sixth Review 
Conference in 2006, this Review Conference Paper considers each of these recommendations 
from the point of view of the States Parties at the Review Conference. 
 
65.  It is worth noting at the outset that the Sixth Review Conference will need to be seen to 
have given consideration to the recommendations of the High Level Panel.  It is 
recommended, as already proposed in Review Conference Paper No. 1021, that the General 
                                                 
19 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC:  Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
20 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC:  Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 
2005, p.10.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
21 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 10, February 2005.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Assembly resolution to be considered in autumn 2005 concerning the Sixth Review 
Conference should indeed contain a preambular paragraph along the lines of: 
 
Bearing in mind the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change relating to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention. 
 
Although it was suggested earlier that this might be upgraded to an operational paragraph 
should the General Assembly or the high level plenary session on 14 – 16 September 2005 
accept the recommendations of the High Level Panel as incorporated into the Secretary-
General’s comprehensive report of March 2005, it is evident that such upgrading will not be 
appropriate given the way in which the recommendations have been incorporated into the 
Secretary-General’s report of March 2005. 
 
66.  The High Level Panel considerations and recommendations relating to biological and 
toxin weapons are considered in turn here from the point of view of the Sixth Review 
Conference. 
 
67.  In regard to infectious diseases, the High Level Panel in para. 68 urged that  
International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society 
organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national 
public health systems throughout the developing world. It went on in para. 69 to recommend 
that Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the WHO 
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential 
disease outbreaks.  Both of these recommendations apply more directly to the World Health 
Assembly and should be considered at the next annual meeting of the Assembly in 2005.  
Insofar as the BTWC Sixth Review Conference is concerned, these considerations of the 
High Level Panel in regard to infectious disease will be one of the factors being born in mind 
by States Parties considering language for the Article X section of the Final Declaration.  
However, in considering language for the Final Declaration, the BTWC States Parties would 
be encouraged to broaden any language to cover animal and plant health as well as human 
health systems.  It may also be drawn upon in considering language for the Article VII 
section of the Final Declaration as Article VII addresses the provision of assistance: 
 
Article VII  
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so 
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger 
as a result of violation of the Convention.  
 
Again, any language for the Final Declaration should be broadened to cover animal and plant 
disease outbreaks as well as human disease outbreaks. 
 
68.  The point made in para. 70 in regard to the possible need for cooperation between the 
WHO and the Security Council in establishing effective quarantine measures in extreme 
cases of threat posed by a new emerging infectious disease or intentional release of an 
infectious agent is unlikely to be considered either by the World Health Assembly or the 
Sixth Review Conference because of the danger such proposals pose to the neutrality and 
effectiveness of the WHO.  However, as noted above, there is a sounder argument to be made 
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in regard to overwhelming outbreaks of infectious disease without regard to their source – 
and without jeopardizing the neutrality and the effectiveness of the WHO. 
 
69.    In regard to the threats we face, the potential danger of biological weapons is 
recognised by the High Level Panel both in the opening sentence of para. 114 and in the body 
of para. 115 whilst para. 116 rightly calls for urgent prevention.   The call for urgent 
prevention in para. 116 is likely to find a resonance in the statements made by the States 
Parties in the opening plenary session of the Sixth Review Conference urging that the Final 
Declaration should incorporate effective steps to strengthen the prevention regime for 
biological and toxin weapons. 
 
70. Insofar as meeting the challenge of prevention, the High Level Panel’s recognition in 
para. 117 that multilayered action is required:  
 
117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should 
feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should 
contain global instruments that operate on the supply side — to limit the capacity of 
both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and the materials and expertise 
needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement 
activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer 
must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence. 
 
will also find resonance in the statements made by the States Parties in the opening plenary 
session of the Sixth Review Conference.   It is to be hoped that the High Level Panel’s 
language will help States Parties focus attention on the various layers and on what action can 
be taken by the Review Conference to strengthen the various elements which together 
provide an effective counter to the threat of biological and toxin weapons.   Indeed the 
perception of a multilayered approach may be very helpful in providing an overall structure 
embracing all the individual actions that are being pursued both within the BTWC and 
without the BTWC. 
 
71.  In regard to better strategies to reduce demand, the High Level Panel in para. 126 
relating to biological weapons says: 
 
126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further 
strengthened, and the long-standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the 
overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible 
verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. 
States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize 
membership. [Emphasis in original] 
 
There are two points that need to be addressed here – first the resumption without delay of 
negotiations for a credible verification protocol and second increasing diplomatic pressure to 
universalize membership of the Convention. 
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72.  Considering universality first, it is recognized that there has long been exhortations by 
the States Parties to the BTWC that more should be done to encourage universality.  It should 
be noted that the First Review Conference in April 2003 of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention agreed in its report that an action plan should be developed and implemented to 
achieve universal adherence to the CWC.   Review Conference Paper No. 1322 sets out in 
some detail what this action plan entails and how it is being implemented by the States 
Parties and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.   It is evident based 
on past experience that an exhortation by the Review Conference is unlikely to be effective in 
promoting universality.  The OPCW’s experience shows that for an action plan to be 
effective, the States Parties to the BTWC will need at the Sixth Review Conference to 
address how best to provide for a mechanism, such as an interim secretariat, that could carry 
out the work necessary to facilitate the implementation of such an action plan.   As already 
noted, the setting up of such an interim secretariat23 is well within the authority of the Sixth 
Review Conference.   The States Parties to the BTWC are strongly recommended at the Sixth 
Review Conference to agree an Action Plan for the universality of the BTWC and to set up 
an interim secretariat to facilitate implementation of the Action Plan. 
 
73.   The other recommendation calling for the long-standing impasse over a verification 
mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to be overcome and for the  
States Parties without delay to return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol 
merits serious consideration.   There is no value in continuing recriminations about why the 
negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group came to an end in July 2001.  Rather, a fresh start needs to 
be made. 
 
74.  It needs to be recalled that the mandate agreed by the States Parties at the Special 
Conference24 in September 1994 was the following: 
 
the Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could 
reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States 
Parties. The objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate 
measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen 
the convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be 
submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. 
 
The essence was thus to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the 
Convention.   The question that needs to be addressed now is whether this objective – to 
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention – would be 
agreed by all States Parties to the BTWC.   It is hard to imagine that any State Party would 
object to such an objective and it is argued that all States Parties would indeed agree to this. 
 
                                                 
22 Scott Spence, Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC 
Experience, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 13, April 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
23 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC:  Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 
2005, p.10.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
24 United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, Geneva 19-30 September 1994.  Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
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75.  Having agreed this objective, the next step is to consider how best the States Parties can 
achieve this objective starting from the Sixth Review Conference in 2006.   By recognizing 
the common agreement to the objective, the onus is put onto all States Parties to address how 
best to move forward to achieve this.   It also needs to be recognized that the Sixth Review 
Conference is not the occasion on which to address the details of how best to achieve this 
objective as there is a great deal of substantive business that needs to be accomplished during 
the three weeks of the Review Conference.   The Final Declaration of the Sixth Review 
Conference should include in its Article V section language along the lines of: 
 
The Conference reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the effectiveness and 
improving the implementation of the Convention and agreed that the States Parties 
would meet in 2007 to consider how best to achieve this objective. 
 
It would be up to the Meeting of States Parties in 2007 to consider how best to achieve the 
objective of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the implementation of the 
Convention.   The temptation to draw language from the High Level Panel’s report should be 
resisted as the aim at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 is to move forward and avoid 
acrimony.   Language as suggested above would be effective in moving the process forward 
and would be an effective response to the High Level Panel recommendation.  
 
76.  It needs, however, to be emphasized that adopting such an approach in 2006 to the issue 
of how best to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention 
should not be regarded as meaning that nothing should be done at the Sixth Review 
Conference.  Indeed, far from this, as the Final Declaration should at least reaffirm the 
comprehensive nature of the prohibitions, an interim supportive institution should be 
established, which could then take forward action plans for universality and for national 
implementation measures, and various other steps taken to strengthen the Convention regime. 
 
77.   In regard to better strategies to reduce supply, it was noted above that para. 134 made a 
specific recommendation in regard to withdrawals from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
in that  A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if 
necessary mandated by the Security Council.   Although the High Level Panel did not extend 
this idea to either the BTWC or the CWC, both of these have Articles which provide a right 
of withdrawal from them. Article XIII (2) of the BTWC states that: 
 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty 
have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, 
related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States 
Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards 
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.  
 
The Sixth Review Conference should consider including language in its Final Declaration in 
the section on Article XIII that, in the event of a State Party giving notice of its withdrawal 
from the BTWC, might encourage the immediate verification of its compliance with the 
Convention, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. 
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78.  The High Level Panel report has three paragraphs relating to nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons.  Para.  133 relates to the reinforcement of international legal provisions 
against the illicit trafficking of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials 
through the ongoing negotiations at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation.  The Final Declaration of the BTWC Sixth Review Conference should consider 
including language in the Article III section which takes note of these ongoing negotiations 
and encourages their timely completion.  
 
79.  Para. 135 recommends Urgent short-term action is needed to defend against the possible 
terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. High priority must 
be accorded to consolidating, securing, and when possible eliminating potentially hazardous 
materials, and implementing effective export controls.   Again, this should be addressed in the 
Final Declaration of the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in the Article III section by 
language which reinforces that in the corresponding section in the Final Declaration of the 
Fourth Review Conference in 1996 in which The Conference affirms that Article III is 
sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or 
subnational levels.   Additional language should be added in the Article III section of the 
Final Declaration to give high priority to consolidating, securing, and when possible 
eliminating potentially hazardous materials, and implementing effective export controls.     
 
80.  Para. 136 addresses Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and recommends that the 
implementation committee of the resolution should establish permanent liaison with the 
IAEA, OPCW and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.    
 
136. The Security Council, acting under its resolution 1540 (2004), can offer States 
model legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls, and by 
2006 develop minimum standards for United Nations Member State implementation. 
To achieve that goal, the implementation committee of Council resolution 1540 
(2004) should establish a permanent liaison with IAEA, OPCW and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group. 
 
The omission of parallel permanent liaison to a secretariat of the BTWC would appear to be 
simply because there was, at the time of the meetings of the High Level Panel, no such 
secretariat.  It is extremely unlikely that the High Level Panel did not see the need for model 
legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls in regard to biological 
materials as SCR 1540 (2004) certainly embraces biological as well as nuclear and chemical 
materials. 
 
81.  It would therefore be recommended that the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006 
should establish an interim secretariat, as already mentioned earlier and proposed 
elsewhere25, and should also address in its Final Declaration the minimum standards to be 
developed by 2006 for United Nations Member State implementation in accordance with 
SCR 1540 (2004). 
 
82.  The High Level Panel report in this section has a paragraph relating specifically to 
biological weapons: 
                                                 
25 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC:  Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 
2005, p.10.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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137. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should also 
negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and 
establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. Within a 
designated time frame, States parties to the Convention should refrain from 
participating in such biotechnology commerce with non-members. [Emphasis in 
original] 
 
It is noted that para. 137 relates specifically to biological agents and that there is no parallel 
relating to chemical agents other than the recognition of the steps that the Security Council can 
take under SCR 1540 (2004).   It can be deduced that the absence of a parallel 
recommendation relating to chemical weapons is because the CWC includes provisions that 
limit the transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals only to another State Party – after prior notification 
of the Technical Secretariat – and also limit transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals only to another 
State Party – and require the provision of an end-use certificate.   Although the CWC requires 
that five years after entry into force of the Convention, consideration shall be given to other 
measures regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not Party to the Convention, 
the First Review Conference of the CWC in April 2003 simply noted that The question of 
whether there is a need for other measures in relation to transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to 
States not Party remains under consideration in the Council. 
 
83.  The idea of a new bio-security protocol was first proposed by the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies as a convention either consistent with the BTWC, or, if need be, outside 
the BWC.  It has, however, to be recognized that this proposal stemmed from the rejection by 
the United States in July 2001 of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations towards a legally binding 
instrument to strengthen the BTWC.   As it was realized that the US national requirements for 
‘select agents’ were more stringent than those in many other countries at that time, moving 
towards an internationally negotiated bio-security protocol or convention was seen as a 
possible way of making progress in the short term. 
 
84.  It is now some four years later and fresh consideration needs to be given to this proposal.  
First, of all, it is not immediately obvious that a bio-security regime is necessarily a part of the 
BTWC regime as it has to be noted that the Convention on Biological Diversity26 and the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety27 have significantly improved world standards relating to 
biosafety and risk assessment of biological activities.  It could therefore be argued that 
considerations relating to the security of biological materials might appropriately be addressed 
in the Convention on Biological Diversity forum. 
 
85.  In addition, in the context of the BTWC, the case for a separate bio-security protocol to 
the BTWC is by no means proven.  If the High Level Panel recommendation that the States 
Parties to the BTWC should without delay return to negotiation of a credible verification 
protocol is seen as being one of its most important recommendations – which it is – then it has 
to be recognized that much of what might be in a bio-security protocol was already in the 
legally-binding instrument being negotiated28 by the BTWC States Parties from 1995 to 2001 
and there is no merit in considering a separate bio-security protocol until such time as the 
                                                 
26 United Nations Environment Programme, The Convention on Biological Diversity.  Available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp
27 United Nations Environment Programme, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp 
28 Jez Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005.  
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negotiations of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention have been completed.   There would be no advantage – and 
much confusion – in trying to establish two parallel sets of negotiations both involving the 
States Parties to the BTWC. 
 
86.  It is therefore recommended that the BTWC Sixth Review Conference should simply 
subsume any consideration of this High Level Panel recommendation into its consideration of 
the recommendation relating to States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol as 
addressed above. 
 
87.   In regard to better enforcement capability, the High Level Panel said that the links 
between the IAEA and OPCW and the Security Council must be strengthened and that The 
Directors-General of IAEA and OPCW should be invited by the Security Council to report to 
it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any 
serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention.   As already 
noted, this recommendation whilst addressing the IAEA and the OPCW excludes any parallel 
consideration of the BTWC. Whilst there may currently not be any OPBW or even an interim 
supportive institution for the BTWC, this is something that could be remedied relatively easily 
by the States Parties to the BTWC at the 2006 Sixth Review Conference.  It is regretted that 
the High Level Panel has not recommended that the President of the Review Conference or 
head of a future secretariat for the BTWC should also report twice-yearly to the Security 
Council on the status of verification processes as well as on any serious concerns they have 
which might fall short of an actual breach of the BTWC.   Although it might be argued that 
there are currently no verification processes under the BTWC, the opportunity could still be 
taken at the present time to report on the status of the annual confidence-building measure 
submissions by the States Parties and at a later stage to report on any eventually agreed 
verification or compliance measures.  It is recommended that the BTWC Sixth Review 
Conference should indeed establish an interim supportive institution that could inter alia be 
called upon to provide regular reports to the Security Council to parallel those proposed for 
the IAEA and the OPCW.  As proposed earlier, one option would be for the Sixth Review 
Conference to authorize its Bureau to remain in existence between the Review Conferences 
and to hold regular meetings in the inter Review Conference years.  Consequently, the 
President of successive Review Conferences could provide a parallel to the Director Generals 
of the IAEA and the OPCW to regularly brief the Security Council until such time as there is a 
parallel organization for the BTWC to the OPCW for the CWC. 
 
88.   In addition, the High Level Panel urged that  
 
Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the Secretary-
General’s roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain 
independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors 
should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in the 
event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below. 
 
It was noted above that this had been developed by the Secretary-General in his report of 21 
March 2005 to: 
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104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The 
capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological agents, 
as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should be strengthened 
to incorporate the latest technology and expertise; and the Security Council should 
make use of that capability, consistent with Security Council resolution 620 (1988). 
 
The Secretary-General’s recommendation in para. 104 that his capability to investigate 
suspected use should be strengthened to incorporate the latest technology and expertise and 
that the Security Council should make use of that capability is welcomed.  In considering 
how to take this forward, consideration should be given to the possible use of the capabilities 
of UNMOVIC29 which has a trained roster of qualified inspectors who could, with an 
appropriate mandate, carry out the strengthened capability required by the Secretary-General.  
It needs to be stressed that merely updating the existing lists of available experts and 
laboratories, that States have advised the Secretary-General that they could make available, 
would not suffice.  It is now evident from the experience gained over the past twenty years 
that any qualified inspectors must be trained and have experience of working as a team and 
further that any laboratories that may be called upon to analyse samples collected by such a 
team must use analytical techniques that have previously been validated through blind testing 
of samples.     
 
89.  The BTWC Sixth Review Conference will be giving consideration to this because one of 
the topics considered at the annual Meeting of States Parties in 2004 was: 
 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
and the Final Report30 of the Meeting of States Parties in December 2004 included: 
 
States Parties are encouraged to inform the Sixth Review Conference of, inter alia, 
any actions, measures or other steps that they may have taken on the basis of the 
discussions at the 2004 Meeting of Experts and of the outcome of the 2004 Meeting of 
States Parties in order to facilitate the Sixth Review Conference’s consideration of the 
work undertaken at the meetings in 2004 and of a decision on any further action in 
accordance with paragraph 18 (e) of the decision adopted at the Fifth Review 
Conference (BWC/CONF.V/17). 
 
The consideration given by the 2006 Sixth Review Conference will depend on what steps 
have been taken in the General Assembly in autumn 2005 to take steps to address the 
recommendation made by the Secretary-general in his progress report of 21 March 2005. 
 
90.  The idea put forward by the High Level Panel that This roster of inspectors should also 
… liaise with WHO authorities in the event of a suspicious disease outbreak should not be 
taken forward as it puts into jeopardy the neutrality and the core role of the World Health 
Organization.   The WHO must continue to be seen as the intergovernmental organization 
                                                 
29 Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, in press. 
30 United Nations, Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Second Meeting, Geneva, 6 - 10 December 2004, BWC/MSP/2004/3, 14 
December 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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that helps its member States cope with outbreaks of infectious disease however caused.  A 
parallel argument applies equally to the OIE and the FAO in regard to animal and plant 
disease outbreaks. 
 
91.   In regard to better public health defences, the High Level Panel made a number of 
statements: 
 
142. Scientific advancements in biotechnology and the ubiquity of facilities capable  
of producing biological agents circumscribe prospects for the elimination of 
biological weapons and complicate verification efforts. But unlike nuclear weapons, 
many (though not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and 
effective responses (including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treatment). Well 
prepared societies may thus be able to avoid the worst-case scenarios of biological 
attacks. 
 
143. However, at present, international aid for infectious disease monitoring, 
detection and response is lacking, security planning and spending are poorly 
coordinated with health-care policies and budgets, and there is insufficient 
understanding that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-defence the 
most viable option against the likelihood of attack. 
 
As noted above, para. 142 makes the statement that unlike nuclear weapons, many (though 
not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and effective responses 
(including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treatment).   This is a surprising statement – 
which is in sharp contrast to the much more accurate assessment of biological weapons made 
in the earlier section on the threats we face, notably in para. 114 and 115 which recognize 
that “deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease could prove equally if not more lethal than a 
nuclear detonation.” Medical countermeasures such as vaccines and effective responses are 
only available for very few of the known biological agents and even there the vaccines are 
not regarded as being suitable for much of the civil population.  It is considered that the High 
Level Panel was unduly optimistic and incorrect in its judgments expressed in the last two 
sentences of para. 142. 
 
92.  As already noted earlier, the High Level Panel is likely to have recognized the benefits 
that building public health defences can bring to improving the well-being of people around 
the globe in all countries – and that building public health defences also helps to counter the 
threat posed by biological weapons.   It would, however, have been better if the High Level 
Panel report had clearly stated the benefits of building public, animal and plant health 
defences around the world and recognized that such enhanced public, animal and plant health 
defences would also counter the threat from biological weapons.  Rather than jeopardizing 
the neutrality of the WHO through suggesting the linkage to the Security Council, it would 
have been prudent if the High Level Panel had recognized that strengthening the capabilities 
of the WHO, OIE and FAO would improve the information available to all the Member 
States to counter human, animal and plant disease outbreaks.  It would then be open for 
individual Security Council members to have judged whether a particular outbreak merited 
consideration by the Security Council for whatever reason. 
 
93, Insofar as the concepts in paragraphs 142 and 143 are concerned, the BTWC Sixth 
Review Conference will address these as another topic addressed by the annual Meeting of 
States Parties in 2004 was: 
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iv. strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and 
existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of 
infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
and the outcome will again be considered by the 2006 Review Conference which may take a 
decision on any further action to be taken.  In addition, the Final Declaration of the Review 
Conference can be expected to address this topic in its Article X section. 
 
94.  In addition, the idea in paragraph 143 of an inevitable, new biological future could with 
advantage be addressed through the proposal made by the United Kingdom in its contribution 
to the Background Paper31 on New Scientific and Technological Developments for the Fifth 
Review Conference in 2001 that: 
 
18.  Throughout the various studies and consultations carried out by the UK to 
inform this review, it has been clear that the rate of change in science and technology 
fields relevant to the BTWC has been much greater than in the previous five year 
period, that is between the third and fourth Review Conferences.  A number of 
advances in scientific knowledge and its applications could be of consequence for the 
provisions of the BTWC.  Given the accelerating pace in science and technology, the 
UK wonders whether it is prudent to maintain a five year gap between such 
assessments under the BTWC.  The UK suggests that the upcoming Review 
Conference consider establishing a mechanism for States Parties to work together on 
a more frequent basis to conduct such scientific and technical reviews and to consider 
any implications at the necessary level of expertise. 
 
It has been argued that the BTWC Sixth Review Conference should establish such a 
mechanism32 as five years is simply too long an interval over which to leave the implications 
of change unexamined.  A practical mechanism for organising this collective scrutiny would 
be to commission a Scientific Advisory Panel to prepare a report each year for an Annual 
Meeting of the States Parties to the BTWC.  There has long been a persuasive case in any 
event for the States Parties to create a Scientific Advisory Panel.   They need to equip the 
BTWC with such a Panel in the interests of acquiring an early warning capacity for 
monitoring scientific threats to their treaty regime. 
 
95.  In addition the High Level Panel moved into dangerous ground in its statement that 
suggests linking the WHO investigators and the Security Council: 
 
144. Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release 
of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an 
infectious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the 
Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious or 
                                                 
31 United Nations, Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001, BWC/CONF.V/4/Add. 1, 26 
October 2001.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
32 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC:  Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security Council 
should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to deploy experts 
reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International Health Regulations do 
not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the 
Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance. In the event that 
a State is unable to adequately quarantine large numbers of potential carriers, the 
Security Council should be prepared to support international action to assist in 
cordon operations. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director- 
General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a 
suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.  [Emphasis in original] 
 
96.  As already noted above, the suggestion that there is a need for the WHO Director-
General, through the Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any 
suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease is flawed as expressed.  
Throughout the past decade, it has become increasingly evident that the effectiveness of the 
World Health Organization rests on its political neutrality and the widespread recognition 
that its purpose is to provide assistance to its member States when they are faced with 
outbreaks of disease.   The ability of the WHO to carry out its primary mission will be 
jeopardized if there should be any suggestion that the Director-General of the WHO is going 
to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of 
infectious disease.   It is considered that the High Level Panel has failed to recognize the 
dangers that its proposals in para. 144 present to the primary mission of the WHO.   It is also 
noted that the Secretary-General appears to have recognized this danger as the approach put 
forward in his progress report of 21 March 2005: 
 
And I myself stand ready, in consultation with the Director-General of the World 
Health Organization, to use my powers under Article 99 of the Charter of the United 
Nations to call to the attention of the Security Council any overwhelming outbreak of 
infectious disease that threatens international peace and security. 
 
appears to try to avoid these dangers.  Nevertheless, this approach put forward by the 
Secretary-General is potentially controversial.  Whilst the language in regard to “any 
overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease” is unexceptional, care needs to be taken as to 
how the words “that threatens international peace and security” are interpreted. Article 99 
of the Charter of the United Nations states that: 
 
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
 
97.  It is far from clear that Article 99 was intended to enable the Secretary-General to bring 
to the attention of the Security Council any event that is catastrophic or overwhelming – such 
as the 26 December 2004 tsunami – as something being catastrophic does not automatically 
bring it within the category of “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” 
 
98.  Any attempt to involve the WHO in a process related to alerting the Security Council on 
matters related to biological threats must be resisted as it could only harm the effectiveness of 
the WHO which must protect its role as the international body that assists all its member 
States in countering the threats posed by disease.  As noted earlier, rather than jeopardizing 
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the neutrality of the WHO through suggesting a linkage to the Security Council, it would 
have been prudent if the High Level Panel had recognized that strengthening the capabilities 
of the WHO, OIE and FAO would improve the information available to all the Member 
States to counter human, animal and plant disease outbreaks.  It would then be open for 
individual Security Council members to have judged whether a particular outbreak merited 
consideration by the Security Council for whatever reason. 
 
99.  There is, however, an argument for the WHO, OIE and FAO through the Secretary-
General to inform the Security Council in the event of an overwhelming outbreak of disease, 
without regard to its cause, in humans, animals or plants as such an outbreak may well merit 
urgent international action to mobilize aid and take steps to contain the outbreak that could be 
considerably facilitated by the Security Council.  It is considered that it would have been 
much better in para. 144 to delete any mention of “suspicious or” and have extended the 
liaison to the Director-Generals of the WHO, OIE and FAO as appropriate. 
 
Conclusions 
 
100.  The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is to be 
commended for a wide-ranging report which has covered an extremely broad canvas.   It has, 
nevertheless, to be appreciated that the High Level Panel although aware of the tensions in 
the areas addressed was not expert in every area and, consequently, its conclusions and 
recommendations have to be considered into the context of the actual developments in any of 
the particular fields that it covers. 
 
101.  This Review Conference Paper has considered the conclusions and recommendations 
reached by the High Level Panel that have relevance to biological weapons from the point of 
view of the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006 which will be the first 
opportunity at which the States Parties to the BTWC will be able to address these conclusions 
and recommendations.   It is concluded that the Sixth Review Conference will need to 
consider the conclusions and recommendations made by the High Level Panel and it is 
recommended that the General Assembly resolution relating to the 2006 BTWC Review 
Conference should include a preambular paragraph referring to the Secretary-General’s High 
Level Panel. 
 
102.  In addition, this Review Conference Paper examines the conclusions and 
recommendations that have relevance to biological weapons developed by the Secretary-
General from the High Level Panel report in his progress report of 21 March 2005 in 
preparation for the high-level summit session of the General Assembly on 14 – 16 September 
2005.  This consideration is again from the point of view of the States Parties to the BTWC. 
 
103.  Many of the High Level Panel’s conclusions and recommendations have merit but it is 
regretted that the High Level Panel in a number of areas omitted inclusion of parallel 
recommendations for the BTWC to those included for the NPT and the CWC especially as a 
strong argument has been made for the Sixth Review Conference to establish an interim 
supportive institution that could fulfil such parallel recommendations.   It is also concluded 
that the wording of some of the recommendations that suggest involvement of the WHO with 
the Security Council in regard to any suspicious outbreak are verging on dangerous ground 
which could jeopardize the central role of the WHO.  There is, however,  a case for the 
WHO, OIE and FAO being able through the Secretary-General to alert the Security Council 
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in the event of overwhelming outbreaks of human, animal or plant disease, regardless of its 
cause, to facilitate the mobilization of aid and the containment of the outbreak. 
 
104.   A central conclusion of the High Level Panel report in regard to Meeting the challenge 
of prevention is that: 
 
117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should 
feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should 
contain global instruments that operate on the supply side — to limit the capacity of 
both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and the materials and expertise 
needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement 
activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer 
must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence. 
 
The BTWC Sixth Review Conference has a major opportunity to strengthen the regime 
countering biological and toxin weapons through endorsement of a strong Final Declaration 
which addresses all of these multilayered actions. As was pointed out in Review Conference 
Paper No. 1133, success is rarely accidental, so those seeking a positive outcome in 2006 will 
have to plan for it.34  The States Parties to the BTWC are urged to start preparing now for the 
Sixth Review Conference in 2006 and achieving a successful outcome.   
                                                 
33 Jez Littlewood, What Would Be a Successful Outcome for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006?, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 11, March 2005.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
34 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 10, February 2005.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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